NTLM Signing in Windows: From Broken FSSO Logons to Phase 2 Enforcement
Security

Microsoft's November update made every Windows client sign NTLM. It broke SSO relays like FortiAuthenticator, and the popular workaround stops working in May 2027.
Windows rewrote the handshake on 10 November
Most patches change things nobody sees. This one changed how every supported Windows client logs on with NTLM, and some users lost access within days.
Until now, a client signed NTLM traffic only when the application asked for it. Otherwise it sent a flag called ALWAYS_SIGN, which Microsoft describes as a placeholder with no cryptographic protection. It looked like signing. It protected nothing.
Since 10 November, clients offer real signing on every non-anonymous NTLM connection. Client and server agree a session key, and every message after logon carries a signature. An attacker relaying the logon has no key, so the relay fails. Microsoft tracks the change as KB5135557 and CVE-2026-118737, across Windows 11 (23H2 to 26H2), Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021 and Windows Server 2016 to 2025.
Windows servers don't enforce anything yet. They accept unsigned clients and log them. Kerberos stays untouched, and anonymous and guest connections stay exempt.

Why SSO relays choke on signed logons
Windows-to-Windows logons kept working. The failures hit products that handle NTLM themselves, and Microsoft lists no known issues in the KB.
FortiAuthenticator never holds the user's password hash, so it relays the NTLM exchange to a domain controller. The client sends type 1, the DC answers with a type 2 challenge, and the client replies with type 3. FortiAuthenticatorforwards each message and waits for the verdict.
Signing adds one more step. SPNEGO (RFC 4178) expects an integrity check called a mechListMIC after type 3, so the DC answers "accept-incomplete" (STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED). The relay expects the exchange to end at type 3, reads that answer as a failure, and drops the logon.
Treat that as the likely mechanism, not a confirmed one. Fortinet's article ties the failures to the new signing behaviour without naming a root cause.

The first three messages relay cleanly. Signing adds a final integrity check, and the relay never sends it.
What the failure looks like
A user patches their laptop on Tuesday. On Wednesday the firewallcan'tidentifythem, user-based policies stop matching, and their applications go dark. FortiAuthenticator logs the whole exchange reaching the domain controller, then failing at the last step:
FCT <client-ip>: recv NTLM type3 msg, seq:100001 len:628
FCT <client-ip>: send NTLM type3 msg to DC
FCT <client-ip>: recv NTLM auth result from DC, result:-1 user:<DOMAIN>/<user> error:NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
FCT <client-ip>: NTLM auth failed for user <DOMAIN>/<user>
The same user logs on fine from an unpatched PC. The fault follows the machine, not the account.
To prove it, capture FortiAuthenticator-to-DC traffic with the Wireshark filter ntlmssp || smb2. You'll see SIGN in type 1, status 0xC0000016 with accept-incomplete on type 3, and no mechListMIC afterwards.
The same log may also show reached maximum client number. Failed clients retry and exhaust the connection slots. The message clears once logons work again.
Who else is affected
Two more products have public reports, both from users rather than vendors. An Omnissa forum thread describes App Volumes agents failing to connect after the November 25H2 updates. A reader comment on Born's IT blog describes NTLM to a Barracuda proxy failing. Confirm with the vendor before you act on either.
Reports for other vendors hadn't surfaced by 19 November. Silence isn't safety, so test explicit web proxies and captive portals that handle NTLM transparently.
A workaround with an expiry date
Every affected vendor and forum points to the same fix: set ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm to 1 under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0 on the client. Logons return.
The value doesn't target the broken product. It strips signing from every NTLM connection the machine makes and reopens the relay exposure the patch closed. Microsoft labels it temporary compatibility only and may remove it.
Deploy it by GPO or Intune to affected machines only. Log every one, and give each a removal date before May 2027.
May 2027: servers start saying no
In May 2027, Windows servers require signing by default (KB5135557, MC1549242). A client that doesn't sign receives SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION (0x80090302), and the server logs Warning event 4023.
Phase 1 broke products that receive NTLM. Phase 2 targets anything that sends it unsigned to a Windows server. First in line: every machine still carrying ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm=1. For FortiAuthenticator customers, Fortinet's fix has to land before May so the workaround can come off.
After that, check the devices that usually run their own NTLM stacks:
- Printers and MFPs with scan-to-SMB or authenticated mail to Exchange
- NAS units, Linux and Samba hosts, older CIFS clients
- Appliances that log on to the domain: identity collectors, backup and monitoring tools
- In-house or legacy applications with embedded NTLM clients
Only your audit logs can confirm which of these sign.

Find unsigned NTLM before May does
Windows already records who signs. Events 4022 (client) and 4023 (server) in the Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational log capture the negotiated flags for each NTLM logon. They need enhanced NTLM auditing, available on Windows Server 2019 and later.
Check the SIGN bit, 0x10. Microsoft's examples: 0xE0888215 carries SIGN and a session key; 0xA0888205 carries neither. Both log at Warning, so filtering by level hides the problem.
The KB5135557 PowerShell script lists every logon missing SIGN, with client IP, hostname and process. On servers older than 2019, an empty log proves nothing; inventory those devices by hand.
A six-month plan
Enforce signing yourself, on your schedule, before Microsoft enforces it on theirs.
- Now to January: enable auditing on domain controllers, file servers, Exchange and IIS. List every unsigned source with an owner and vendor.
- January to March: demand releases that support signing, and a written Phase 2 statement, from each vendor. Move to Kerberos wherever you can: Kerberos-based FSSO, keytabs on proxies, correct SPNs. Replace or isolate what can't change.
- As fixesland: remove ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm=1, machine by machine.
- Six to eight weeks before May:setServerRequireNtlmSign to 1 on a few low-risk servers. It needs no restart. Watch for Warning event 4023, fix what surfaces, then widen the rollout.
A device that can never sign gets an explicit ServerRequireNtlmSign=0 exception on its server, with an owner and an end date. That buys time; it fixes nothing.

Quick answers
Does this touch Kerberos? No. Microsoft excludes Kerberos from both phases.
When exactly does Phase 2 start? Microsoft says only May 2027. A reader on Born's IT blog claims the workaround stops working in March 2027. Nobody has confirmed that, but planning for March costs nothing.
Can I enforce early? Yes. Once your audit shows no unsigned logons, set ServerRequireNtlmSign to 1.
What happens with older servers that can'tsign? The client drops signing and carries on. Microsoft confirms no failure in that case.
The short version
- Windows clients sign NTLM by default since 10 November; servers don't enforce it yet.
- SSO relays like FortiAuthenticator break on signed logons. Fortinet confirms it; Omnissa and Barracuda reports come from users.
- ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm=1 restores logons and strips signing from the whole machine.
- In May 2027, Windows servers reject unsigned clients, workaround machines first.
- Audit events 4022 and 4023 for the SIGN bit, fix or replace what doesn't sign, then enforce early.
References
- Microsoft: KB5135557, NTLM signing security improvements in Windows
- Microsoft 365 Message Center: MC1549242
- Fortinet: FortiAuthenticator SSO session failure with NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
- Omnissa Community: Connection problems with November 25H2 updates
- Born's IT and Windows Blog: November 2026 Patchday problems
- IETF: RFC 4178, SPNEGO